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Abstract
Background: Since 1976, Medicare has linked reimbursement for hospitals performing organ
transplants to the attainment of certain benchmarks, including transplant volume. While Medicare
is a stakeholder in all transplant services, its role in renal transplantation is likely greater, given its
coverage of end-stage renal disease. Thus, Medicare's transplant experience allows us to examine
the role of payer leverage in motivating hospital benchmark compliance.
Methods: Nationally representative discharge data for kidney (n = 29,272), liver (n = 7,988), heart
(n = 3,530), and lung (n = 1,880) transplants from the Nationwide Inpatient Sample (1993 – 2003)
were employed. Logistic regression techniques with robust variance estimators were used to
examine the relationship between hospital volume compliance and Medicare market share;
generalized estimating equations were used to explore the association between patient-level
operative mortality and hospital volume compliance.
Results: Medicare's transplant market share varied by organ [57%, 28%, 27%, and 18% for kidney,
lung, heart, and liver transplants, respectively (P < 0.001)]. Volume-based benchmark compliance
varied by transplant type [85%, 75%, 44%, and 39% for kidney, liver, heart, and lung transplants,
respectively (P < 0.001)], despite a lower odds of operative mortality at compliant hospitals.
Adjusting for organ supply, high market leverage was independently associated with compliance at
hospitals transplanting kidneys (OR, 143.00; 95% CI, 18.53 – 1103.49), hearts (OR, 2.84; 95% CI,
1.51 – 5.34), and lungs (OR, 3.24; 95% CI, 1.57 – 6.67).
Conclusion: These data highlight the influence of payer leverage–an important contextual factor
in value-based purchasing initiatives. For uncommon diagnoses, these data suggest that at least 30%
of a provider's patients might need to be "at risk" for an incentive to motivate compliance.
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Background
Recently, an article in the Los Angeles Times cited that
"about a fifth of federally funded (heart, liver, and lung)
transplant programs fail to meet the government's mini-
mum standards" and "perform too few operations to
ensure competency" [1]. After being picked up by the
Associated Press and several other major media outlets,
the Times' article garnered the attention of Senator Charles
Grassley (Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee),
prompting him to begin a federal inquiry. Senator Grass-
ley "has ordered investigations (and) demanded answers
after ... reports detailing dangerous lapses in oversight of
the national transplantation system." [2]. In response, Dr.
Mark McClellan, a former senior administrator for the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, has spoken
out in defence of Medicare's transplant monitoring pro-
gram [3]. Currently, empirical data addressing the con-
cerns germane to this emerging policy debate are lacking.
Medicare's "minimum standards" for transplant pro-
grams, and issues surrounding hospital compliance with
these benchmarks, have been in existence for thirty years.
Since 1976, hospitals performing kidney transplants
under the Medicare program have been required to meet
benchmarks for accreditation, including kidney trans-
plant volume [4]. With its successive coverage announce-
ments for heart, liver, and lung transplants [5-7],
Medicare has mandated similar volume standards,
thereby linking benchmarking to reimbursement for all
major solid organ transplants. However, as the Times'
report illustrates, hospital compliance with these bench-
marks varies widely [1]. Even prior to the recent media
attention, concerns have been raised regarding the appro-
priateness of Medicare's standards and a possible lack of
rigorous transplant program supervision [8]. These factors
may explain, in part, the observed low rates of hospital
compliance. Another important contextual factor may be
Medicare's leverage with hospitals as a payer of transplan-
tation services to promote compliance (i.e., payer market
leverage).
Under the 1972 Social Security Act Amendments, Medi-
care guaranteed coverage to all patients with chronic renal
failure requiring hemodialysis [9]. These benefits extend
to kidney transplant services, as well. Thus, Medicare's
stake in kidney transplantation is significant. However, no
such entitlement presently exists for patients with other
chronic disease states that commonly lead to organ trans-
plantation; therefore, Medicare's payer market leverage is
expected to be lower for other organ sites.
For this reason, we examined hospital transplant program
compliance with Medicare's volume-based criteria, as well
as the relationship between Medicare's market leverage
and hospital benchmark compliance using national dis-
charge data. Because payer market leverage is a likely
determinant of the effectiveness of contemporary pay-for-
performance programs [10-12], the Medicare experience
has implications beyond the current debate surrounding
transplant programs. As the ability of value-based pur-
chasing initiatives to improve healthcare quality relies on
provider compliance, this study provides empirical data
that characterize the relationship between leverage and
compliance.
Methods
Data source
Data from the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project's
Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) between years 1993
and 2003 were used in this analysis. The NIS is a 20%
stratified sample of all hospital discharges in the U.S. and
consists of uniform hospital discharge summaries from
non-federal acute-care hospitals throughout the U.S. [13].
It is a useful dataset for multi-year longitudinal studies. To
date, more than 25 manuscripts have been published
using multiple years of the NIS that cover a breadth of
healthcare topics, including solid organ transplantation
[14-17]. In accordance with the Code of Federal Regula-
tions Title 45 Subpart A Section 46.101 paragraph b sub-
paragraph 4, Institutional Review Board approval was
waived for this study.
Subjects
Using  International Classification of Disease, 9th Revision,
Clinical Modification (ICD-9) procedure codes, we identi-
fied patients undergoing kidney (55.6, 55.69), liver (50.5,
50.51, 50.59), heart (33.6, 37.5), lung (33.5, 33.50,
33.51, 33.52), and combined heart-lung (33.6) trans-
plants. Because Medicare has separate participation
requirements for pediatric transplant programs, subjects
under 18 years of age were excluded. Based upon this sam-
pling methodology, a cohort was identified consisting of
29,272 kidney, 7,988 liver, 3,530 heart, and 1,880 lung
transplants that were performed at 173, 88, 100, and 66
hospitals, respectively. Data on patient demographics
(age, gender, race/ethnicity, admission acuity, diagnosis
codes and primary payer) and hospital characteristics
(teaching, profit, and proprietary status, urban/rural loca-
tion, geographic census region, and hospital bed capacity)
were also abstracted from the NIS. Secondary ICD-9 diag-
nosis codes were used to identify a set of 30 comorbidities
as described by Elixhauser [18].
After aggregating data on each transplant recipient's pri-
mary payer to the hospital-level, a binary variable was
constructed, identifying those hospitals performing trans-
plants with a high proportion of Medicare patients. The
literature suggests that an incentive applying to less than
15% to 20% of a provider's patients is unlikely to alter
provider behavior [11]; therefore, an indicator variableBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:112 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/112
Page 3 of 9
(page number not for citation purposes)
was constructed to identify hospitals where 20% of trans-
plants, by type, were reimbursed through Medicare and
thereby distinguish those hospitals in which Medicare
had low vs. high market leverage.
To estimate the supply of available donor organs, each
hospital performing transplants was assigned to one of
the 11 U.S. regions created by the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS), based on the hospital's two-letter
state postal code as provided by the NIS. Data from UNOS
on the number of donors recovered in the U.S. by organ
type [19] were then merged with the study population
files on UNOS region and year.
Ascertainment of hospital volume compliance
The number of transplant procedures performed at each
hospital was ascertained using a unique hospital identifi-
cation code. Based on Medicare's coverage announcement
for lung transplants [7], combined heart-lung transplants
were counted toward both the heart and lung case volume
totals for an individual hospital. Each hospital was
assigned a volume for each year it participated. Each indi-
vidual hospital-year was considered independently.
Binary variables were then constructed indicating whether
the hospital-year was compliant with Medicare's volume
benchmark for each transplant type. The hospital-year
volumes and binary volume compliance variables were
then assigned to the discharge records that emanated from
them. This was done for each transplant type, using those
minimum volume requirements specified in the Federal
Register. Specifically, hospitals were required to perform a
minimum of 15, 12, 12, and 10 kidney, liver, heart, and
lung transplants, respectively, over a 12-month period for
Medicare approval [4-7].
Outcomes
The primary outcomes for this study were the proportion
of hospitals performing transplants compliant with Medi-
care's volume criteria and patient-level operative mortal-
ity, defined as death prior to hospital discharge.
Statistical analyses
With the hospital-year as the unit of analysis, bivariate
comparisons were performed for volume compliant and
non-compliant hospitals based on transplant procedure
strata. These comparisons focused on hospital structural
attributes, as well as the clinical characteristics of their
patients. T-tests were performed for continuous variables,
and chi-square tests were performed for categorical varia-
bles.
The relationship between hospital volume compliance
and Medicare market share was examined through logistic
regression techniques with the use of robust variance esti-
mates to adjust for potential cluster effects [20]. The con-
cern for cluster effects arose because of the potential for a
hospital to be included in a multiple number of years,
which could induce a correlation and would require
adjustment.
For these models, the unit of analysis was the hospital-
year. The outcome was CMS volume benchmark compli-
ance. The exposure was high Medicare market leverage
(the binary variable described above). Given the well-doc-
umented regional variation in transplantation [21], these
models were adjusted for donor organ supply, introduced
as a continuous count. The count of donor organ supply
was UNOS-region specific, into which each hospital was
sorted. These models were also adjusted for hospital case
mix. For this, patient-level data were aggregated to the
hospital level in order to derive a mean count of the Elix-
hauser codes [18] specific for the four different transplant
procedures, which described each hospital's "typical"
patient.
Medicare's coverage announcement for lung transplants
was made in 1995 [7]. This allowed for a secondary anal-
ysis, in which the odds of volume compliance as a func-
tion of Medicare's market share were compared prior to
(1993 to 1994) and after (1995 to 2003) the specification
of minimum caseloads.
Next, the relationship between patient-level operative
mortality and hospital volume compliance was examined
using generalized estimating equations (GEE). Given that
not all of the hospitals were represented in multiple years
of our sampling frame, the data did not represent a true
panel structure. However, there was potential correlation
between observations as patients were clustered within
hospitals. Therefore, GEE models with a logit link and an
exchangeable correlation matrix were fitted to produce a
population-averaged odds ratio (OR) and a robust estima-
tor to correct the standard errors for the potential correla-
tion of observations within hospitals [22].
For our analysis of operative mortality (outcome), our
unit of analysis was at the patient level. Our exposure was
hospital-level volume benchmark compliance. Each
model was adjusted for patient age, gender, race, comor-
bidity, and insurance type, as well as treatment year,
teaching status, for-profit status, ownership, hospital bed
capacity and census region. Case-mix adjustment was
accomplished using a subset of the Elixhauser comorbid-
ity flags [18], in which those comorbidities directly related
to the principal diagnosis were removed.
In addition to the analysis using these basic GEE models,
sensitivity analyses were conducted to test the potential
affect of several assumptions. In particular, hospital par-
ticipation in the NIS varies by year with some hospitalsBMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:112 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/112
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included in multiple years. Specifically, 111, 54, 60, and
40 hospitals performing kidney, liver, heart, and lung
transplants were sampled in multiple years. To determine
whether those with more frequent participation had an
undue influence on the results, a dataset was constructed
that included a randomly selected year of data only for
those hospitals that were sampled multiple times as part
of the NIS sampling frame. The operative mortality analy-
ses were then repeated using this new dataset. Since the
results remained consistent across these analyses, only
those results from the primary GEE models are reported.
All statistical analyses were two-tailed, with a 5% signifi-
cance level, and were conducted using Stata version 9.0
(Stata Corp, College Station, Texas).
Results
Over the study interval, Medicare was the primary payer
for 57% of kidney, 28% of lung, 27% of heart, and 18%
of liver transplants (P < 0.001). The proportion of hospi-
tals compliant with Medicare's volume benchmarks var-
ied by transplant type, ranging from as low as 24% of
hospitals performing lung transplants in 1995 to as high
as 96% of hospitals performing kidney transplants in
2003. Average compliance for hospitals performing kid-
ney transplants was 85%, 75% for liver transplants, 44%
for heart transplants, and 39% for lung transplants (P <
0.001). Temporal changes in volume compliance status
stratified by transplant type are depicted in Figure 1.
Patients receiving kidney transplants at volume compliant
hospitals were generally older, and a higher proportion
were male when compared to those treated at non-com-
pliant hospitals (Table 1). A higher proportion of volume
compliant kidney and liver transplant hospitals were
teaching facilities with a larger bed capacity than non-
compliant hospitals (Table 2).
Further, high Medicare market leverage was found to be
independently associated with hospital volume compli-
ance for hospitals performing kidney [OR, 143.00; 95%
confidence interval (CI), 18.53–1103.49], heart (OR,
2.84; 95% CI, 1.51 – 5.34), and lung (OR, 3.24; 95% CI,
1.57 – 6.67) transplants. A similar association, although
not statistically significant (OR, 1.87; 95% CI, 0.87 –
4.04), was found for hospitals performing liver trans-
plants. For those years of the study interval (1993 to
1994) during which no lung transplant minimum
caseloads were specified, the OR for volume compliance
was 1.38 (95% CI, 0.15 – 12.66). Following Medicare's
coverage announcement, the OR rose to 3.73 (95% CI,
1.70 – 8.19).
Unadjusted operative mortality rates were 1% for kidney,
9% for liver, 9% for heart, and 11% for lung transplants.
Results from the adjusted models are presented in Tables
Table 1: Comparisons between the average transplant recipient at Medicare volume compliant and non-compliant hospitals.†
KIDNEY LIVER HEART LUNG
Non-
compliant
(n = 40)
Compliant
(n = 133)
P-value Non-
compliant
(n = 29)
Compliant
(n = 59)
P-value Non-
compliant
(n = 60)
Compliant
(n = 40)
P-
value
Non-
compliant
(n = 40)
Compliant
(n = 26)
P-value
Mean age ± std
dev (years)
37.0 ± 
12.9
45.2 ± 3.1 ** 46.3 ± 
14.1
49.4 ± 2.2 49.8 ± 
11.1
51.4 ± 3.2 46.8 ± 
13.6
49.4 ± 4.0
Prop female 46% 41% * 38% 38% 30% 24% * 50% 50%
Prop w/>15%
Black
36% 37% 8% 8% 15% 21% 13% 3% *
Prop elect 
admit
40% 38% 31% 22% * 22% 22% 21% 16%
Prop w/>20%
Med pen
73% 100% ** 24% 38% 47% 71% ** 43% 71% **
Abbreviations: std dev, standard deviation; prop, proportion; w/, with; elect admit, elective admission; Med pen, Medicare penetration
† T-tests assuming unequal variances were performed for continuous variables and chi-square analyses were performed for categorical variables.
*For P ≤ 0.05.
**For P ≤ 0.001.
Transplant center compliance with Medicare's volume crite- ria stratified by year Figure 1
Transplant center compliance with Medicare's volume crite-
ria stratified by year.
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3, 4, 5, 6. Patients undergoing liver transplantation at
non-compliant hospitals had a significantly greater risk of
operative mortality (OR, 1.50; 95% CI, 1.12 – 2.02), even
after adjustment for age, gender, race, comorbidity status,
treatment year, and insurance type. A trend toward greater
operative mortality risk was also observed for non-com-
pliant hospitals performing kidney, heart, and lung trans-
plantation, although these results did not reach statistical
significance.
Discussion
Consistent with lay press reports, we have demonstrated
substantial hospital non-compliance with Medicare's vol-
ume-based benchmarks for heart and lung transplant pro-
grams. We found that benchmark compliance varies by
transplant type despite the fact that patients undergoing
liver transplantation at volume compliant hospitals have
lower odds of operative mortality. Importantly, bench-
mark compliance was observed to vary with Medicare's
market share for each organ type, with compliance being
greatest among hospitals performing kidney transplants,
where Medicare was the primary payer for 57% of dis-
charges. In contrast, benchmark compliance was lowest
for lung transplantation, a procedure where Medicare was
the primary payer for only 28% of cases.
Medicare's policy for transplant programs is predicated on
the assumption that hospital compliance with volume
standards will translate into better patient outcomes.
Along this line of thinking, Medicare has linked both
transplant program accreditation and procedural reim-
bursement to the attainment of its benchmarks. While
Medicare's volume thresholds were initially set without
any evidence base, substantial literature has since been
published documenting higher mortality after selected
high risk procedures, including organ transplantation, at
low-volume centers [23-27]. Despite this, these data sug-
gest that even the combination of a valid benchmark and
a powerful incentive (accreditation and reimbursement in
this case) may be insufficient to ensure uniform hospital/
provider compliance.
Accordingly, these data highlight the importance of other
contextual factors (e.g., payer leverage) on the success of
performance-based incentive programs. Efforts to moti-
vate providers through financial incentives are thought to
have a limited effect unless the payer promoting the
incentive program represents a substantial proportion of
the provider's practice [11,12]. It is estimated that an
incentive program applying to less than 15% to 20% of a
provider's patient panel is unlikely to induce provider
response [11]. For infrequent diagnoses and procedures–
heart and lung transplants in this study–these data suggest
that such leverage may be inadequate to motivate change.
These findings must be considered in the context of sev-
eral limitations. To begin, donor organs represent a scarce
commodity with a relatively fixed supply and an inelastic
demand [28]. As such, concerns surround not only the
attainability of Medicare's volume benchmarks, but also
Medicare's ability to leverage its market share to affect
hospital compliance. With an estimated 14,000 kidney,
5,000 liver, 2,000 heart, and 1,000 lung transplants per-
formed annually [29] at 244 kidney, 123 liver, 135 heart,
and 68 lung transplant centers nationwide [19], Medi-
care's volume thresholds would appear reasonable if the
Table 2: Comparisons between measures of structure for Medicare volume compliant and non-compliant hospitals.†
Kidney Liver Heart Lung
Non-
compliant
(n = 40)
Compliant
(n = 133)
P-value Non-
compliant
(n = 29)
Compliant
(n = 59)
P-value Non-
compliant
(n = 60)
Compliant
(n = 40)
P-value Non-
compliant
(n = 40)
Compliant
(n = 26)
P-value
Prop teach 60% 84% ** 71% 88% * 83% 87% 84% 90%
Prop priv 45% 36% 48% 20% ** 42% 23% ** 35% 13% *
Prop for-profit 4% 3% 5% 0% * 3% 0% 3% 0%
Prop urban 97% 100% * 100% 100% 97% 100% * 99% 100%
Bedsize
Small 19% 4.% ** 14% 4% * 6% 1% 9% 0%
Med 21% 20% 22% 16% 21% 18% 19% 24%
Large 60% 76% 64% 80% 73% 81% 72% 76%
Region
NE 19% 25% 24% 16% 13% 11% 15% 8%
NC 25% 23% 20% 29% 33% 28% 35% 27%
South 33% 27% 29% 30% 33% 37% 33% 29%
West 23% 25% 27% 25% 21% 24% 17% 36%
Abbreviations: prop, proportion; teach, teaching; priv, private; med, medium; NE, northeast; NC, north-central
†Chi-square tests were performed for all categorical variables.
*For P ≤ 0.05.
**For P ≤ 0.001.BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:112 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/112
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Table 4: Adjusted odds of operative mortality following liver 
transplantation at volume non-compliant hospitals.
COvariate Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval
Volume non-compliant 1.50 1.12 – 2.02
Female 1.16 1.02 – 1.33
Race
White 1 (ref.) --
Black 0.94 0.58 – 1.53
Hispanic 1.13 0.83 – 1.55
Asian 1.01 0.67 – 1.51
Other 1.28 0.99 – 1.66
Insurance type
Medicare 1 (ref.) --
Medicaid 0.81 0.64 – 1.02
Private 0.85 0.66 – 1.08
Operative year
1993 1 (ref.) --
1994 0.80 0.49 – 1.31
1995 0.70 0.41 – 1.19
1996 0.75 0.43 – 1.29
1997 0.62 0.34 – 1.13
1998 0.44 0.25 – 0.77
1999 0.66 0.44 – 0.98
2000 0.52 0.33 – 0.81
2001 0.42 0.23 – 0.74
2002 0.41 0.26 – 0.64
2003 0.47 0.30 – 0.74
Elixhauser codes
Congestive heart failure 2.54 1.63 – 3.94
Arrhythmias 2.08 1.47 – 2.93
Valvular disease 0.61 0.32 – 1.17
Pulmonary circulation disorders 3.48 2.09 – 5.80
Peripheral vascular disorders 1.21 0.44 – 3.28
Paralysis 2.27 0.62 – 8.22
Neurologic disorders 1.09 0.52 – 2.27
Chronic pulmonary disease 1.04 0.67 – 1.60
Diabetes mellitus, complex 0.94 0.54 – 1.63
Hypothyroidism 0.54 0.28 – 1.04
Renal failure 1.34 1.02 – 1.77
Peptic ulcer disease 0.62 0.28 – 1.38
Rheumatoid arthritis 0.98 0.38 – 2.50
Coagulopathy 1.86 1.55 – 2.23
Weight loss 0.71 0.52 – 0.99
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 1.23 1.02 – 1.49
Blood loss anemia 1.21 0.59 – 2.50
Deficiency anemias 0.59 0.38 – 0.93
Psychoses 0.32 0.10 – 1.00
Depression 0.17 0.04 – 0.67
Hospital census region
Northeast 1 (ref.) --
North-central 0.45 0.34 – 0.61
South 0.61 0.50 – 0.75
West 0.53 0.40 – 0.71
Hospital bedsize
Small 1 (ref.) --
Medium 0.66 0.46 – 0.95
Large 0.79 0.58 – 1.08
For-profit 1.18 0.06 – 21.83
Private 0.96 0.75 – 1.23
Teaching 1.04 0.78 – 1.38
Table 3: Adjusted odds of operative mortality following kidney 
transplantation at volume non-compliant hospitals.
COvariate Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
Volume non-compliant 1.64 0.77 – 3.52
Female 1.01 0.80 – 1.26
Race
White 1 (ref.) --
Black 1.05 0.76 – 1.45
Hispanic 0.94 0.60 – 1.48
Asian 1.21 0.70 – 2.07
Other 1.05 0.72 – 1.51
Insurance type
Medicare 1 (ref.) --
Medicaid 0.50 0.38 – 0.66
Private 1.42 0.96 – 2.10
Operative year
1993 1 (ref.) --
1994 1.21 0.71 – 2.07
1995 1.03 0.59 – 1.77
1996 1.35 0.80 – 2.27
1997 1.21 0.72 – 2.04
1998 0.61 0.31 – 1.19
1999 0.73 0.40 – 1.36
2000 0.57 0.29 – 1.10
2001 0.82 0.43 – 1.56
2002 0.54 0.27 – 1.07
2003 0.81 0.44 – 1.48
Count of Elixhauser codes 1.30 1.20 – 1.41
Hospital census region
Northeast 1 (ref.) --
North-central 0.74 0.46 – 1.17
South 0.89 0.59 – 1.35
West 0.60 0.38 – 0.94
Hospital bedsize
Small 1 (ref.) --
Medium 0.93 0.44 – 1.96
Large 0.96 0.47 – 1.93
For-profit 1.47 0.50 – 4.32
Private 0.82 0.55 – 1.22
Teaching 1.12 0.69 – 1.82BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:112 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/112
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distribution of donor organ supply was equitable across
centers.
Second, in this study, high Medicare market share was
independently associated with higher odds of compli-
ance, even after adjustment for regional donor organ sup-
ply. However, our adjustment for supply alone may be
imperfect, as compliance among hospitals performing
liver transplantation, for which Medicare has the smallest
market share, was similar to that of kidney transplanta-
tion rather than heart or lung transplantation. This indi-
cates that there may be other factors influencing the
caseload size for hospitals (e.g., the number of patients
with end stage renal disease in the nearby area). Neverthe-
less, this study highlights the interplay between market
share and supply as potential determinants of compliance
with volume-based benchmarks.
A third limitation concerns this study's observational
design. Given the inherent endogeneity of the data, the
directionality of the association between Medicare market
share and hospital compliance cannot be directly dis-
cerned. For example, what we have interpreted as a lever-
age effect may instead be a selection effect. However, these
data do suggest a trend towards increasing compliance
across transplant types following Medicare's successive
transplant coverage decisions (Figure 1) [4-7]. Further, we
Table 6: Adjusted odds of operative mortality following lung 
transplantation at volume non-compliant hospitals.
COvariate Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval
Volume non-compliant 1.43 0.83 – 2.46
Female 0.95 0.75 – 1.20
Black 1.45 0.72 – 2.89
Insurance type
Medicare 1 (ref.) --
Medicaid 0.83 0.59 – 1.16
Private 0.78 0.47 – 1.29
Operative year
1993 1 (ref.) --
1994 0.81 0.38 – 1.71
1995 0.65 0.27 – 1.55
1996 1.26 0.60 – 2.61
1997 1.03 0.46 – 2.28
1998 0.49 0.15 – 1.58
1999 1.03 0.46 – 2.32
2000 0.95 0.29 – 3.17
2001 0.56 0.23 – 1.33
2002 1.04 0.42 – 2.60
2003 0.67 0.28 – 1.58
Count of Elixhauser codes 0.98 0.86 – 1.12
Hospital census region
Northeast 1 (ref.) --
North-central 0.67 0.39 – 1.16
South 0.87 0.50 – 1.53
West 0.83 0.47 – 1.47
Hospital bedsize
Small 1 (ref.) --
Medium 0.55 0.15 – 2.01
Large 0.42 0.13 – 1.38
For-profit 1.17e-12 1.73e-13 – 7.93e-12
Private 0.86 0.47 – 1.55
Teaching 0.73 0.35 – 1.52
Table 5: Adjusted odds of operative mortality following heart 
transplantation at volume non-compliant hospitals.
COvariate Odds Ratio 95% Confidence 
Interval
Volume non-compliant 1.19 0.92 – 1.54
Female 1.57 1.23 – 2.00
Black 0.88 0.58 – 1.36
Insurance type
Medicare 1 (ref.) --
Medicaid 0.77 0.61 – 0.98
Private 0.58 0.40 – 0.86
Operative year
1993 1 (ref.) --
1994 1.15 0.72 – 1.85
1995 0.61 0.32 – 1.19
1996 0.78 0.44 – 1.39
1997 0.75 0.48 – 1.17
1998 0.51 0.28 – 0.95
1999 1.18 0.72 – 1.92
2000 0.86 0.49 – 1.52
2001 0.51 0.27 – 0.96
2002 0.73 0.38 – 1.38
2003 0.63 0.34 – 1.16
Elixhauser codes
Diabetes mellitus, complex 0.54 0.18 – 1.68
Renal failure 1.09 0.59 – 1.98
Liver disease 6.05 2.04 – 18.00
Peripheral vascular disorders 1.43 0.75 – 2.71
Paralysis 1.49 0.31 – 7.08
Neurologic disorders 2.78 1.74 – 4.44
Chronic pulmonary disease 0.66 0.41 – 1.08
Hypothyroidism 0.61 0.29 – 1.30
Rheumatoid arthritis 0.51 0.06 – 4.50
Coagulopathy 3.23 2.48 – 4.21
Weight loss 1.25 0.55 – 2.87
Fluid and electrolyte disorders 1.03 0.80 – 1.32
Blood loss anemia 0.59 0.14 – 2.55
Deficiency anemias 0.09 0.02 – 0.39
Psychoses 0.43 0.05 – 3.37
Depression 0.35 0.08 – 1.52
Hospital census region
Northeast 1 (ref.) --
North-central 0.48 0.34 – 0.67
South 0.43 0.31 – 0.60
West 0.37 0.25 – 0.56
Hospital bedsize
Small 1 (ref.) --
Medium 0.50 0.19 – 1.28
Large 0.49 0.21 – 1.15
For-profit 6.26 0.33 – 119.38
Private 1.13 0.85 – 1.50
Teaching 0.97 0.69 – 1.35BMC Health Services Research 2007, 7:112 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/7/112
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are reassured by the results from our secondary analysis in
which we examined the relationship between compliance
and Medicare market share for lung transplants in the
absence of a minimum threshold.
Fourth, transplant-relevant clinical endpoints are limited
within these administrative data. While alternative trans-
plant outcomes (e.g., incidence of delayed graft function
and graft survival) would have made this analysis richer,
we could only examine the clinical and resource use infor-
mation included in a typical discharge abstract. Moreover,
our primary measure, operative mortality, is an infrequent
event, particularly following kidney transplant [30].
Though a significant difference in patient mortality for
liver transplantation was demonstrated at volume compli-
ant vs. non-compliant hospitals, the ability to detect a dif-
ference for kidney, heart, and lung transplants was
perhaps limited by sample size. Further investigation is,
therefore, warranted to examine the effect of volume com-
pliance on more common, long-term outcomes using
clinical data.
Finally, comment can only be made on a hospital's attain-
ment of Medicare's transplant volume benchmarks. A
hospital's actual Medicare accreditation status cannot be
ascertained within the NIS. Medicare requires that trans-
plant programs undergo review every three years; how-
ever, even prior to the recent Los Angeles Times report, the
Office of the Inspector General raised questions about the
rigor of this oversight [8]. A new rule change has been pro-
posed to address these concerns [31], but current lack of
enforcement may contribute to the relatively low compli-
ance among heart and lung transplant programs.
Conclusion
This study provides a nationally representative estimate of
hospital compliance with Medicare's volume criteria for
transplant programs and suggests the potential influence
of payer market share in motivating benchmark compli-
ance. While others have suggested that an incentive apply-
ing to less than 15% to 20% of a provider's patient panel
is unlikely to induce provider response [10], these find-
ings would indicate that for infrequent diagnoses and pro-
cedures, more than 30% of provider's patients might need
to be impacted by an incentive in order to motivate
change. These data also have implications for Medicare's
current pay-for-performance initiatives [32]. For those
public health issues that disproportionately affect patients
under age 65, Medicare may lack the leverage to alter pro-
vider behavior. Given the fragmented nature of the U.S.
healthcare system, multilateral efforts between Medicare
and other payers may, therefore, be necessary to achieve
the intended aims of specific value-based purchasing ini-
tiatives.
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